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Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account [Cornell Studies
in the Philosophy of Religion]. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University
Press, 1998, xi and 258 pages, Hb $35.00.
The last quarter century has seen a notable upsurge of interest among analytical philosophers of religion in the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de
Molina and his notion of divine ‘middle knowledge’, so-called because its
modal reach lies somewhere between an a priori knowledge of necessary
truths and an a posteriori knowledge of contingent facts. The objects of
middle knowledge are ‘counterfactuals of freedom’, subjunctive conditionals
of the form, ‘Were condition C to obtain, agent X would (freely) perform
action A’. If divine omniscience includes middle knowledge, then God not
only knows what every actual agent has done, is doing, and will do, but He
also knows what those agents (and indeed, any possible agent) would do
in any set of circumstances in which they might find themselves. Clearly a
God endowed with middle knowledge is not only smarter than a God who
lacks it (reason enough to ascribe such knowledge to Him); He is also more
competent in securing His ends, since this knowledge (unlike knowledge of
what is, was, and will be) is available to Him prior to the actualization of
a particular world, and can thus guide Him as He determines which initial
conditions to create and which subsequent interventions to undertake. Middle
knowledge is controversial, for various reasons, but there is clearly a good
deal riding on the controversy.
Thomas Flint, a leading proponent of ‘Molinism’, has written a stimulating exposition and defense of middle knowledge. The book is divided into
three parts. In the first part Flint shows how Molinism arises naturally out
of the traditional Christian interest in ascribing to God the greatest sovereign control which is compatible with genuinely free human agency. If free
agency is understood in libertarian terms (as Flint maintains that it should
be), God cannot cause us to do of our own free will what He would like us
to do; the best He can do is bring about the conditions in which we would
freely do what He desires, and He can bring about those conditions only
if He knows what they are. It is middle knowledge (not knowledge of the
past, present, and/or future) which enables Him to identify those conditions.
Middle knowledge does not give God everything He would like: among the
things it reveals to Him (regrettably enough) is that there are no conditions
under which everyone will freely act in optimal ways. But it does enable
Him to secure the best ‘feasible’ (as opposed to the best logically possible)
outcome.
The second and longest section of the book defends Molinism from
various threats, beginning with the blandishments of alternative accounts.
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Flint places Molinism on a map of providential theories, with Thomism and
‘the open view’ (which denies both middle knowledge and foreknowledge
in favor of divine risk-taking) as its principal rivals. Thomism provides God
even more providential control than Molinism but at the price (Flint argues)
of an unacceptably attenuated conception of free agency, while ‘openism’
receives high marks for its stand on free agency but leaves God too little
control over events (even less, Flint argues, than the ‘openists’ advertise).
Given the troubles afflicting its rivals, Molinism is the clear-cut winner
unless it can be shown to suffer from crippling defects of its own. The
bulk of the section is therefore devoted to three critiques of Molinism: “the
‘grounding’ objection,” “Hasker’s attack,” and “Adams and vicious circle
arguments.” What these three objections have in common is the idea that
the relevant conditionals and the way they function in the Molinist scheme
are actually incompatible with libertarian agency. Flint offers some powerful
counterattacks, which anti-Molinist objectors will not have an easy time
answering.
The third section is devoted to ‘applied Molinism’, exploring some of
the uses to which middle knowledge can be put. Here Flint goes beyond
the general theological advantage of middle knowledge adumbrated earlier
in the book to examine some specific issues surrounding the exercise of
divine providence, namely, papal infallibility, prophecy, unanswered prayers,
and praying about the past. In each case he finds unexpected difficulties to
solve along the way, but shows in the end how the resources of Molinism are
adequate to the task.
How well does Flint carry off his project? Better than this friendly skeptic
would have thought possible. Nevertheless, there are at least a couple of
points at which Flint’s defense of Molinism is not quite as decisive as he
would like it to be. In the first place, a balance-sheet defense of Molinism
depends crucially on the comparison with its rivals’ balance sheets, and
Flint errs in treating ‘openism’ as Molinism’s only real rival (at least among
theories which take free will seriously). This ignores the traditional middle
ground which affirms divine foreknowledge while denying (or failing to
recognize) middle knowledge. Flint apparently agrees with the ‘openists’ that
foreknowledge is providentially useless, but this is implausible on its face.
(Think how much of our own attempts to control the future are guided by
guesses about what other agents will do. Wouldn’t these attempts be more
effective if we could know and not just guess?) Foreknowledge cannot secure
all the providential benefits of middle knowledge, to be sure, but it does
give God more control than present knowledge alone. This makes it, and not
‘openism’, the preferred fallback position should Molinism founder on the
charge of conceptual incoherence.
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In the second place, Flint’s defense of Molinism does not dispel the
fundamental suspicion which drives the grounding objection. The most
straightforward version of the objection is this. For the counterfactual C >
A to be true, A must be true in the closest (most similar) world(s) to Wα (the
acutal world) in which C is true. Call this world, which “grounds” the truth
of C > A, W1 . But if A is an exercise of libertarian free agency in W1 , there
must be a world just like W1 (up to the last moment at which the agent is
still free with respect to A) but in which not-A. Call this world, required by
the libertarian character of A, W2 . This presents a prima facie problem for
Molinism. On the one hand, for C > A to be true, W1 must be closer to Wα
than is W2 . On the other hand, it’s hard to identify any difference between W1
and W2 , relevant to evaluating the counterfactual C > A, in virtue of which
W1 is closer than W2 to Wα . (They will differ with respect to A, but this is
both an irrelevant difference and also one which, even if relevant, could work
just as well to the advantage of W2 , depending on whether it is A or not-A that
is true in Wα .) Flint suggests as a relevant difference that C > A itself is true
in Wα (and W1 ) but not in W2 . But since it is the truth-conditions of C > A
that are in question, this is little different than saying that the counterfactual
is just true and that’s all there is to it – a position Alvin Plantinga has at
least entertained, but which Flint wishes to avoid. It is doubtful that anyone
troubled by the grounding objection in the first place will be much relieved
by this answer.
What Flint does accomplish, however, he accomplishes most impressively.
His are the arguments that anyone involved in the debate over Molinism will
now have to engage, while even readers with little interest in divine providence may find the book worth studying just for its insights into explanatory
priority, counterfactual power, and similar topics of general interest.
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